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This thesis offers guidance for hostage-rescue operations by the Indonesian Armed 
Forces Special Forces. It analyzes three hostage situation case studies: two involving the 
United States and one involving Indonesia. These case studies are analyzed using the 
principles of special operations applicable to a rescue operation. These principles, derived 
from the theory of special operations, are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, 
purpose, operators’ skills, and deception. Along with the theory of special operations, 
several guiding principles are also considered to both enhance the analysis and upgrade 
Indonesian doctrine for these particular rescue operations. These guiding principles are 
drawn from U.S. doctrine regarding military development in countries around the globe. 
Both the current Indonesian doctrine and manual need to be adjusted to reflect the 
dynamics of the current shifting nature of threats. A sound and systematic doctrine 
offering applicable guidance maximizes the chances of a successful operation. 
Furthermore, this thesis highlights the distinct phases and characteristics within a special 
operation. It provides a thorough understanding of the need for clear Indonesian doctrine 
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A. BACKGROUND ON RESCUE OPERATIONS 
Indonesian citizens residing abroad may be affected by internal and external 
issues within the country where they live or work. Internal problems may arise due to the 
behavior of Indonesians themselves, while external problems may arise due to existing 
circumstances in the country where Indonesians are located. One such incident happened 
in Somalia with the Indonesian cargo ship Motor Vessel (MV) Sinar Kudus, which was 
carrying a load of Ferronickel. On March 16, 2011, during its journey from Kolaka 
(Celebes, Indonesia) to Rotterdam (Netherlands) the ship was hijacked by Somali Pirates.   
The capture of the MV Sinar Kudus sparked a debate within Indonesia. The 
Preamble of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution contains the phrase, “protect all the people 
and the entire country of Indonesia, promote the general welfare, the intellectual life of 
the nation, and participate in the establishment of world order based on freedom, lasting 
peace, and social justice.”1 The phrase “protect all the people” obligates the government 
and relevant agencies to protect Indonesian citizens wherever they are in the world. In 
order to deal with these types of problems, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), 
as the main national strength, is assigned the mission to protect Indonesian citizens 
overseas. In addition, Indonesian Regulation No. 34, 2014 mandates that the TNI: 
“protect all the people” and deems necessary the formation of a unified task organization 
of the TNI and related agencies in order for TNI to possess the ability to execute an 
evacuation or a rescue operation successfully.2 Therefore, this thesis examines the 
necessity for Indonesia to establish such a new organization. This task normally falls to 
the Special Forces within the Indonesian Armed Forces. However, Indonesian Special 
Forces from the three services are not well prepared to handle extra-territorial rescue 
operations since there is no manual for this particular mission. 
                                                 
1 Undang-undang Dasar Tahun 1945 [Indonesian Constitution 1945].  
2 Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Armed Forces] (Undang-undang) [Indonesian 
law], No. 34, (2001). 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What critical conditions and factors are necessary to maximize the success of a 
rescue operation?   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW    
Joint Publication 3-68 about Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, sets forth a 
joint doctrine identifying the activities and performances of the U.S. Armed Forces 
necessary to conducting such operations. There are four phases for conducting successful 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations:  
1. Preparatory operation. In this phase, the NEO task force is activated to 
carry out necessary intelligence gathering, logistical preparation, 
exercises, and the completion of other administrative activities. 
2. Preliminary operation. In this stage, the elements within the NEO task 
force, and particularly the implementation team, are shifted to the staging 
area to carry out the planning and set up a command center that requires 
evacuation. Operating in locations where the task force may encounter 
armed force necessitates military operation preparatory actions 
3. Evacuation operation. This phase is the most important in the overall 
operation. In this phase, the NEO task force will carry out the tactical 
deployment of the evacuation process, to include securing both vital areas 
and the point of embarkation, and providing security forces to secure the 
evacuation process 
4. Withdrawal and Redeployment. This stage is the final stage of the overall 
NEO operation. Implementation of the evacuation task is complete when 
all the citizens are safe.3  
These principles are included in the analyses of the three cases included in this 
thesis and are utilized in the development of an exemplary model for Indonesian rescue 
operations, in particular extra-territorial operations that include both foreign and 
government officials.  
In U.S. Army Doctrine Preference about the Operations Process, the “Army’s 
framework for exercising a mission is the operations process – the major mission 
                                                 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2010), II-14. 
 3 
command activities performed during operations, to include planning, executing, and 
continuously accessing the operation.” Assessment is needed throughout the process, 
from the beginning of planning, and preparation, to the implementation of the operation 
itself. The major mission command activities are defined as follows: 
1. Planning. Interpret the situation and determine how to work effectively.  
2. Preparing. It involves preparations made to get the troops ready for 
impending operation.   
3. Executing. Implement combat skills to complete the task.  
4. Assessing. Complete a given task, create the desired effect or achieve a 
predetermined goal.4  
TNI’s guide on joint operations, explained that the implementation of joint 
operations is conducted in three stages: planning, execution, and termination. These 
stages are defined as follow: 
1. Planning. It is done through a process by a combined staff.  
2. Executing. Preparation of operation and execution of the operation. 
3. Termination. Tactical and administrative measures such as consolidation, 
reporting on the implementation of tasks, resume tasks or withdraw on 
orders.5 
In this thesis, these stages are compared and merged with the previously cited 
doctrines from the U.S. manuals.  
According to William H. McRaven, in his book Spec Ops: Case Studies in 
Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice, there are six principles of Special 
Operation that have to be followed and if one of them is overlooked, disregarded, or 
bypassed, inevitably the mission is jeopardized. The six principles of Special Operations 
are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. These principles provide 
the basic framework for the analysis of the three cases included in this thesis. 
                                                 
4 Department of the Army, The Operations Process (FM 5-0) (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2012), iv. 
5 Indonesian National Armed Forces, TNI’s Guide on Joint Operations (Jakarta: Indonesian National 
Armed Forces, 2003), Appendix I. 
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Edward S. Devlin in his book Crisis Management Planning and Execution 
mentioned that, when a crisis reaches its highest stage, the management team should use 
the “following steps: take charge quickly, determine the facts, tell your story, and fix the 
problem.”6 If these steps are followed, then the organization will be in control in the 
crisis. These steps should also be included in the proposed tactical handbook for an 
Indonesian group leader and commander of the rescue operation while conducting a 
mission, especially under critical conditions that demand rapid decision-making based on 
the situational and conditional assessment. 
An article by Jennifer Morrison Taw with Marcy Agmon and Lois M. Davis 
published by RAND, entitled “Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other 
Than War,” talks about lacking capability of both sides.7 It also provides 
recommendations such as giving the soldiers as well as the civilian’s knowledge of either 
side’s capabilities, in order to ensure the effective coordination and cooperation during an 
operation, and overcoming the organizational differences between the Military and the 
civilians.8  
An interesting thesis written by former Naval Postgraduate School student Jerry J. 
Kung, about using non-lethal weapons in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 
addresses the possibility that using non-lethal weapons would mitigate the risks of 
escalation in the threat level because the mission itself could be jeopardized, even though 
non-lethal weapons have no role in the NEOs. Kung also explained how the challenge of 
NEOs is to control the crowd through the use non-lethal weapons, due to the potential for 
violence. However, the differences between the U.S. and Indonesia in capability, military 
and civilian assets are significant. Nevertheless, Kung’s ideas could be used in the search 
for the right solution for Indonesia. 
                                                 
6 Edward S. Devlin, Crisis Management Planning and Execution, (New York: Auerbach Publications, 
2007), 2. 
7 Jennifer Morrison Taw, Marcy Agmon, and Lois M. Davis. “Interagency Coordination in Military 
Operations Other Than War.” RAND Institute. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monograph_reports/2007/MR825.pdf 
 8 Ibid. 
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D. METHODOLOGY  
To evaluate the conditions which may lead to the success or failure of a rescue 
operation, this thesis examines in depth three different case studies of rescue operations 
conducted overseas by different armed forces of the world. Two of these operations were 
conducted successfully, and one was unsuccessful. The first case is the attempted 2011 
rescue of American citizens in Somalia, at the end of which the rescuers discovered the 
pirates had already killed the American yachters. The second case involves the rescue 
operation conducted successfully by Indonesian forces of the Indonesian MV Sinar 
Kudus, which was taken hostage by Somali pirates. The third case is the 2009 rescue 
operation of Capt. Richards Phillips.  
These cases were selected in order to compare the differences in techniques and 
quantum of force utilization in addition to planning, preparation, rehearsals, and both the 
assault and post assault phases of the operation.  
This thesis analyzes the above cases by applying the principles from the 
aforementioned references in order to peel away the elements within each case and 
comprehend the principles involved. At the end of this thesis, the authors propose a 
contemporary doctrine, drawn from the above references, that is applicable to the current 
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II. RESCUE OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In understanding the essence of special operations tasked with the distinct goal of 
the rescue mission, one should first comprehend the definition and elements of a rescue 
operation. A successful rescue mission only results from the deliberate planning and 
application of all aspects and elements of the operation. In Field Manual 90-29, 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) are defined as operations “to evacuate 
civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from locations in a foreign 
(host) nation during time of endangerment to a designated safehaven.”9 A NEO is 
“characterized by uncertainty and may be directed without warning because of sudden 
changes in a country’s government”10 that could include the reorientation of diplomatic 
and military relationships within one’s own country, a sudden hostile threat to the citizen 
of one’s own country “from a force within or external to a hostile nation, or a devastating 
natural or man-made disaster.”11 Furthermore, NEO operations have widespread 
implications in humanitarian, military, economic, diplomatic and political arenas. 
Therefore, NEOs involve the swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation, and a well-
planned withdrawal of the force along with the evacuees at the end of the operation.12 
The specific characteristics in the environment make NEO operations distinct from other 
military operations. In JP 3-68, the highest authority on the evacuation operation is 
positioned within the authority of the ambassador in the host nation, instead of the 
geographic combatant commander (GCC) or the subordinate joint force commander 
(JFC).13 NEO operations can be conducted within several distinct environments, which 
may be sub-divided into three types. In the first, a permissive environment exists wherein 
                                                 
9 Department of the Army, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (FM 90-29) (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 1994), I-1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (JP 3-68) (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2010), I-3. 
12 Ibid., ix. 
13 Ibid. 
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the operation is conducted with the accord of the host nation. In this environment, there is 
no resistance to the planned NEO. Therefore, there could be some form of support 
provided by the host nation. In the second, an uncertain environment exists, one without a 
distinct form of governance or control by the host nation. The host nation’s forces may be 
in support of, or in opposition to, the NEO operations. In the third, a hostile environment 
exists that could take the form of civil disorder, terrorist action, or full-scale combat. In 
this environment, one’s own forces are expected to encounter heavy resistance from any 
forces in the host nation. However, this thesis will examine those operations that take the 
place in the open seas, where no positive law of any nation is in effect. Therefore, the 
command and control of the NEO comes directly from the combatant commander or the 
on-site commander/ task-force commander.     
William McRaven states that in order to achieve a successful special operations 
mission, one should use certain principles so that the friendly force can achieve relative 
superiority toward the enemy.14 Furthermore, McRaven mentions that typically the 
attacking force is relatively smaller in size than the defensive force at the target. For that 
particular reason, the phases of special operation begin with the preparation phase, 
progress to the assault phase, and end with the post assault phase. Each phase should be 
carefully executed in order to gain the intended result for the mission. Therefore, this 
chapter explains the operational phases of special operations, so as to provide guidance in 
the preparation of special rescue operations.  
Gazit15 mentions that special rescue operations have the ideal goals of 
• Rescuing the hostages alive and well. 
• Conducting the operation with minimum or no collateral damage or 
casualties. 
• Limiting casualties, if there should be any, to the perpetrators or terrorists. 
                                                 
14 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operation Warfare: Theory & Practice, 
(New York: The random House Publishing Group, 1996), 11. 
15 Shlomo Gazit, “Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security,” International 
Security 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532. 
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• Assuring there are no further political or military ramifications that could 
affect wider aspects than the hostage rescue operation.   
These goals should become the principal guidelines in planning a rescue 
operation, since they can be the standard by which to measure the result of any such 
operation. Ideally these goals would set a high standard in the planning of an operation, 
and all efforts would then be focused on achieving them and gaining the best end results. 
However, the dynamics of the situation on the ground can affect the end goals. For that 
particular aspect, the flexibility and innovation of skilled operators is required in 
accomplishing the mission’s goals. This chapter discusses these aspects of the rescue 
operation in further details.   
As per the Indonesian Constitution no. 34 year 2004 on Indonesian Armed Forces, 
the special rescue mission operation falls under the realm of Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW).16 Within the scope of the constitution, Indonesian forces are able 
to conduct the necessary operations to address the emergence of the threats menacing the 
sovereignty of Indonesia and undermining the national security interests. However, the 
operational guidance of such operations, and in particular the rescue mission operation, is 
still undeveloped to the level that all essential elements are not yet correlated in the 
operational structure of a rescue mission’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and 
Rules of Engagement (ROEs). Nevertheless, any operation should be planned and based 
on the principles and elements of special rescue operations conducted by other armed 
forces, such as the U.S. forces. 
B. PRINCIPLES OF THE SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATION 
In exploring the possibilities of conducting a rescue operation, William McRaven 
explains that not all of the supporting personnel are special operators. However, they are 
trained, equipped, and supported relative to the specific goal within the mission.17 
Therefore, the basic principles of a special operation should not be limited to only special 
                                                 
16 Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Armed Forces] (Undang-undang) [Indonesian 
Law], No. 34, (2001). 
17 William H. McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 1993). 
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operations personnel; hence, the involvement of non-special units should be considered. 
As long as the involved units can communicate, cooperate, and function together as one 
unit during the mission, it is not necessary to have only special operators conducting the 
mission.  
This thesis tailors McRaven’s six principles of special operations,18 to the needs 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces while conducting special rescue operations. Those 
principles include the following:  
1. Simplicity 
The imperative challenge of a special operation is to make the plan sufficiently 
simple that it can be understood and executed by everyone. According to McRaven, the 
three critical elements of simplicity are a limited number of objectives, good intelligence, 
and innovation. Simplicity is critical for the success of any rescue operation. From the 
perspective of a rescue mission, the focused objective has to be designated early in the 
planning phase to avoid confusion. Good intelligence is essential and might be the 
decisive factor influencing the success of the whole mission. Innovation should be 
considered in expanding the means by which the alternate methods are employed to 
achieve the mission’s goals.19 
2. Security   
It is imperative to keep information about the operation secure and not to allow 
the enemy to gain any intelligence through other means. It is paramount to keep the 
planned movement of the operation as secure as possible. However, it is also important to 
bear in mind that an adversary will prepare itself for an incoming attack in order to 
disrupt the rescuers’ goals. In the context of a rescue mission, information security of the 
mission should be heavily guarded in order to avoid any information leak that could 
compromise the mission. Any faux pas of the information security would not only 
jeopardize the mission, but may result in collateral damage.20 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operation Warfare: Theory & Practice, 
(New York: The random House Publishing Group, 1996), 11. 
20 Ibid., 14. 
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3. Repetition/Rehearsal
Repetition instills in the personnel involved in the mission a “muscle memory” of 
what each individual must do during the mission. McRaven considers this principle 
indispensable in providing a greater chance of mission success. This principle has a 
general application in any domain. Repetition will bring perfection to any plan while at 
the same time reducing the possibility of mission failure.21    
4. Surprise
The element of surprise may be the one critical factor that contributes to the 
victory and success of a mission. Therefore, a good plan should always include the 
element of surprise as one of the advantages that should be maintained during the 
execution of the mission. McRaven emphasizes this aspect while mentioning that the 
enemy will also prepare itself in anticipation of a surprise attack. In the framework of a 
rescue mission, surprise might be considered heavily in the circumstances where the 
hostages are safe and no collateral damage may result. However, in the special occasion 
of a hostage threatened, the element of surprise could only inflict further damage; it is 
then the responsibility and judgment of the operator to decide whether the element of 
surprise will still prove advantageous to the goal of the mission.22  
5. Speed
The principle of speed is applicable to any military operation despite the nature of 
the mission. McRaven emphasizes the use of speed to avoid expanding of the area of 
vulnerability.23  
6. Purpose
The purpose of the mission should be understood by everyone involved in the 
operation before executing the mission. A well-defined purpose of the mission is vital for 
21 Ibid., 15. 
22 Ibid., 16. 
23 Ibid., 19. 
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the whole operation. In a rescue operation, the purpose of the rescue mission could be 
described in one word, rescue.24 
McRaven’s six principles are considered the basic principles of all special 
operations. McRaven perceives them as essential to gain an advantage over the mission 
situation by conducting simple planning that is concealed (security) and rehearsed 
repeatedly and realistically. The execution should include the element of surprise with 
speed and purpose in order to achieve the main task and reach the goals. 
In addition to the previous six principles, Carlos Perez in his Master’s thesis25 
describes four main principles of a hostage rescue operation that are similar to 
McRaven’s. The principles are,  
1. Intelligence  
Perez mentions that intelligence, based on the Joint Pub 1–02, 2003, 261), is the 
product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and 
interpretation or available information concerning foreign countries or areas. It is 
information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, 
investigation, analysis, or understanding. Similar to McRaven, Perez perceives the use of 
good intelligence information in a rescue operation as vital to knowing the situation and 
the updated condition of the target mission area, including the hostile and friendly factors 
on the ground. Moreover, the requirement of intelligence for a hostage rescue mission is 
very specific and often very different, relative to the surrounding environment. Therefore, 
in order to obtain such information, the technical and human intelligence assets should be 
able to provide the requested information regarding the dynamic change of the mission 
area. For the U.S. armed forces, hi-tech equipment in conjunction with human assets 
supports the technical assets’ capability to gain intelligence information. In the case of 
Indonesia, the armed forces do not enjoy such hi-tech luxury in their efforts to gather 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 21. 
25 Carlos M. Perez, “Anatomy of a hostage rescue: What makes hostage rescue operations 
successful?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
13 
information; therefore, the optimization of human assets should be maximized in 
gathering intelligence information prior to conducting a military rescue mission.26  
2. Surprise
Perez explains that special operations forces should be able to achieve and 
maintain the element of surprise so that the adversary is unable to react effectively. 
Surprise requires bold, imaginative, and audacious action in order to execute a mission 
that requires surgical precision. Furthermore, citing from Bob Leonhard’s, The Principles 
of War for the Information Age, Perez describes the two types of surprise, technical and 
tactical, and states both should be gained in order to have an advantage over the mission 
situation. He considers that the presence of an absolute surprise is vital to the successful 
execution of the mission plan. Moreover, the element of surprise is highly dependent on a 
good planning and the exploitation of intelligence on the enemy’s weaknesses.27  
3. Operator’s Skills
Special operations require special skills. Perez elaborates on this distinction by 
explaining that the “operator’s skill” means that the personnel involved within a specific 
rescue mission should have the capability required to finish the mission successfully. 
This assumption aligns with McRaven’s theory that a regular Special Operation Force 
(SOF) could not fulfill the demand of a hostage rescue operation. In McRaven’s theory, 
the personnel must be trained repetitively to meet the high level demands of a specific 
rescue operation. Moreover, some operations may involve the Close Quarter Battle 
(CQB) capability. Therefore, the high demand of an operator’s skills in a high-risk rescue 
operation should be fulfilled by repetitive yet realistic rehearsal.28  
4. Deception
Rescue operations require the secure entrance of the rescuer force without being 
compromised. In order to gain that advantage, a good deception plan should be employed 
at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, negotiation could be used to 





deception may be used to distract the enemy from seeing the incoming rescue mission, 
thereby giving the rescue party a breaching and entry point to execute the rescue 
mission.29 
This thesis acknowledges all of the aforementioned principles of a good rescue 
operation in developing the basic guidelines for an Indonesian Armed Forces rescue 
operation. However, eight principles, drawn from McRaven and Perez, form the 
framework for the analysis of each case below. Specifically, these principles are 
simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, purpose, operator’s skills, and deception.  
C. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESCUE OPERATIONS 
Gazit outlines three characteristics that distinguish the nature of the rescue 
operation from the conventional military operation.30  
1. First, a rescue operation is the climax of a war that should be resolved by a 
specific military act. All efforts that encompass diplomatic, psychological, 
and military aspects are employed for the sake of the operation. The 
success of a rescue operation is also a matter of war-like victory or defeat 
for the country.31    
2. Second, a rescue operation is the privilege of political leadership in 
making the call to deploy the mission. Therefore, the responsibility for the 
success of the operation will rest in the hands of the political authority. 
There are many aspects to the general picture of a rescue operation. The 
complexity of domestic and foreign pressures that mount around the 
necessity to conduct a special rescue operation can influence the decision 
and planning of the operation itself.32  
3. Third, the planning of a military rescue operation should heavily consider 
the political constraints resulting from a deteriorating situation since the 
leadership will bear all responsibilities for whatever way the operation 
ends. And political leadership considers that unfavorable outcome of 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Shlomo Gazit, “Risk, Glory, and Rescue Operation in the International Security,” International 
Security 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532. 
31 Ibid., 113-115. 
32 Ibid. 
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rescue mission is not acceptable to them, they make call of the operation 
and look for alternate solutions.33  
Interestingly, Gazit argues that, similar to war in the Clausewitzian realm, rescue 
operations should be the last resort of an effort regarding the hostages and the necessity 
to rescue them. It is significant that the authority begin with negotiations without 
submitting to the demands of the terrorists.  
D. THE PHASES OF RESCUE OPERATIONS 
A rescue operation can be divided into three common phases34 fundamental to the 
success of a mission. These phases relate to the previously discussed characteristics and 
principles of a rescue operation.  
1. Phase I: Planning 
In order to understand rescue operation planning, it is necessary to first 
understand how the planning processes of rescue operations and classical military 
operations differ. Gazit explains that rescue operations have four planning principles.35  
(1) First, considering the nature of the threats, rescue operations often involve 
very dynamic, rapid changes to the situation. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider bright, original, and even crazy ideas. The conventional military 
plan emphasizes the correct use of military assets. However, in a rescue 
mission, the use of “out of the box” concepts can ensure the element of 
surprise and expand the possibility of a successful mission with minimum 
casualties and collateral damage.36 
(2) Second, it is important to save time in the mission preparation while 
waiting the political decision to be made. Time is crucial in a rescue 
operation; therefore, while the political authority weighs the non-technical 
aspects of the operation, the planners and operators should prepare 
themselves up until the moment leadership promulgates the decision.37 
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(3) Third, within the planning process, the involvement by the leadership is 
required in order to create a dialogue between planners and decision 
makers. This is important because effective and efficient planning that 
involves the authority eliminates bureaucratic delays. The establishment of 
such a dialogue will enhance understanding by both the planners and the 
political leaderships.38 
(4) Fourth, besides the planners and the political leaderships, either the 
operators or the commander of the unit to be deployed for the mission 
should also be involved in the planning of the mission. Learning the 
capabilities of the operators from the personnel directly involved in 
executing the mission is important in determining the actual feasibility of 
the mission.39 
The planning process should consider executing the operation while the 
perpetrators are still unsure of the outcome of their actions. Therefore, timing is crucial in 
the planning of an operation. However, waiting is also an option for the rescue force, 
allowing the operators to prepare themselves to the point that they are ready and all 
supporting elements are on hand. There are, though, several disadvantages to waiting. In 
some cases, the hostages can develop a special relationship or feeling toward the 
perpetrators known as the Stockholm syndrome.40 In addition, the situation can 
deteriorate while the tension and pressure directed toward the hostages can increase. 
Nevertheless, it is all depend on the overall situation. When the situation is under control, 
a longer wait will increase the possibility of success. On the contrary, when situation is 
out of control, timing becomes the ultimate determiner of the operation’s success.  
A good plan should always have a back-up plan in case during the operation the 
situation spirals out of control. Besides the main action plan, the rescue force should be 
equipped with a contingency and emergency plan for any possible scenario of the 
mission. Perez comes up with a valid rescue plan that comprises several prerequisites of 
the decision-making process.41 Few of the prerequisites of a sound rescue plan 
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39 Ibid. 
40 Carlos M. Perez, “Anatomy of a hostage rescue: What makes hostage rescue operations 
successful?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
41 Ibid. 
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considered necessary by Perez are mentioned by Richard Yarger in his paper and which 
are : 
(1) The overall plan must be suitable. This means that the mission is in 
accordance with the political constraints mandated by the authority, and 
yet still accomplishable.42 
(2) The plan must be feasible. The operators of the rescue mission can 
accomplish the mission within the time window given, with the support 
elements provided, and with the emerging constraints that may come 
along the way.43 
(3) The plan should be acceptable. The advantage and the cost resulting from 
a particular course of action are still in balance. If possible, the advantage 
outweighs the cost and the risks.44 
(4) The plan should be distinguishable. The course of actions given to the 
operators should be distinct from one to another. The avoidance of 
confusion is important so that operators on the ground will be able to 
identify a specific course of action and the possible outcomes of that 
option.  
(5) Finally, the plan should be complete. The overall plan must consist of the 
detail requirement of forces, deployment mode, support elements, time 
frame of the operation, the extraction plan, contingency plan, and aim of 
the mission.  
2. Phase II: Approach and Assault 
After a relatively long process of planning, the next phase of a rescue operation 
typically is the implementation phase. However, the implementation plan should be 
rehearsed and repeated in order for the operators to become accustomed to the required 
actions during the operation. Once the plan and preparation are finalized, the next phase 
involving the approach and assault may be executed. This phase is the decisive phase 
since it will decide the outcome of the rescue operation. It is important to remember that 
                                                 
42  H. Richard Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College 
Strategy Model,” in The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Vol. 1: Theory of War 
and Strategy, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army 




any movement by the force attempting the rescue should remain undetected by the 
adversary in order that the element of surprise and unanticipated action may increase the 
possibility of a successful mission.  
Full coordination between the command control systems and the operators should 
be maintained at all times. This is so that all elements involved with the operation may be 
updated on the current situation. While the command control element is monitoring the 
progress of this phase, the operators should always be ready for any abrupt changes on 
the ground and be prepared to implement the contingency and emergency plan in case the 
mission is compromised. The unit leader is the one who is responsible for assessing the 
conditions at first sight and reporting them through the chain of command to the 
command and control system. Further assessment could be made in a timely fashion and 
forwarded to the operators, so they can execute the immediate decision in accordance 
with the developing situation. The communication and coordination function is crucial 
during the approach and assault phase.  
During the assault, the hostages’ safety is the priority of the rescue force. 
However, during the raid attack, the firing and explosions may surprise the hostage, who 
may become confused and not know how to react or what to do. The role of the rescue 
force is to firstly secure the hostage in a safe place to avoid any casualties. The possibility 
of having a terrorist disguised as one of the hostage could complicate the operation. This 
situation should be handled carefully; therefore, the operators should consider all 
personnel lacking proper identification within the perimeter of the mission dangerous 
until consultation with the support elements at command and control indicates otherwise.  
3. Phase III: Postassault 
Once phase II is finished, it does not mean that the operation is completed. If the 
hostages can be liberated, it is another task to safeguard them to a safe place in order for 
them to receive further treatments by the authorities. The operators might encounter 
hostages who demand something out of proportion, which could jeopardize the whole 
operation. Therefore, it is necessary for the rescue operators to be firm with the hostages 
for the safety of all. There is no room of tolerance within the critical situation of a rescue 
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mission. While securing the target area, the rescue force should deny any external 
intervention that could negate the entire phase. After the situation is deemed secure by 
the field unit commander, the extraction process may continue.  
During the extraction, the supporting elements of the rescue force must maintain 
the highest alert for any developing situation that could potentially disrupt the extraction 
of the hostages. Furthermore, the status of each hostage must be confirmed before they 
are transported to a safe haven. This action is necessary in order to firmly control the 
situation. In the enemy’s territory, the rescue force should act as the sole unit 
accommodating every emergency need of the hostages, in particular medical aid. 
However, in the friendly area, those responsibilities should fall to the designated agencies 
that involve the supporting elements.  
The execution of a planned rescue operation requires an immense joint effort from 
all elements involved in the operation at all phases. Moreover, a clear accordance 
between those in command who are making the call and the operators on the ground 
should be established so that both elements comprehend the situation. Moreover, the 
decision to deploy a rescue operation acquires a bold decision from the political 
leaderships since the responsibilities of whatever outcome will rest on their shoulders.  
To summarize, we can divide the rescue operation into three phases: planning, 
approach and assault, and post assault. After discussing the principles of special 
operations given by both McRaven and Perez, this thesis views operator’s skill and 
repetition as similar principles. The principle of surprise is also found common for both 
the writers, so during the next chapter this thesis analyzes all the case studies under eight 
principles: intelligence, simplicity, purpose, repetition, security, speed, surprise and 
deception. Intelligence, simplicity, purpose and repetition occur during the planning 
phase (phase I). Speed and surprise are more relevant during the approach and assault 
phase (phase II). While deception can supports the security of the information, it would 
definitely help to achieve surprise, so in this context both the principles of security and 
deception have to be incorporated across all phases.  
 
 20 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 21 
III. ANALYSIS OF CASES 
“Special operations are operations conducted by specially organized, 
trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, 
political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional 
military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These 
operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, 
independent of, or in coordination with, operations of conventional, non 
special operations forces.” The Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 
(Joint Pub 3–05).  
 
William McRaven, in his book Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, includes rescue missions in the category of special 
operation because special operators that are involved, and specific preparation prior to the 
operation is required for the mission to be successful.45 There are four operations in 
McRaven’s book that resemble or constitute a rescue mission; Operation Oak: The 
Rescue of Benito Mussolini; The U.S. Ranger Raid in Cabanatuan; Operation Kingpin: 
The U.S. Army Raid on Son Tay; and Operation Jonathan: The Israeli Raid on Entebbe. 
Fundamentally, a rescue operation can be categorized as a special operation that is 
unconventional in the nature of its deployment and usage. The specific goals and mission 
determine the degree to which the mission differs from the conventional warfare in the 
use of forces and deployment of tactics and strategy. Special operations rescue missions 
are conducted from a disadvantaged position for the force conducting the operations. In 
McRaven’s term, the adversary has the advantage of place or fortified position.46 In 
preparing to gain a relative superiority over the enemy, the offensive force must prepare 
itself very well.  
In the effort to formulate the guidelines for rescue or hostage rescue operations by 
the Indonesian Special Operations forces, this thesis analyzes three specific cases 
involving special operations rescue missions. Two cases are drawn from the U.S. Special 
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46 Ibid., 3. 
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Operations Forces experience, and one case is taken from the Indonesian Special Forces 
experience.  
A. THE RESCUE OF CAPTAIN PHILLIPS 
1.  Chronology of the Story 
a. Background: 
The MV Maersk Alabama was in route to Mombasa, Kenya, after a short transit 
in Djibouti. The hijacking took place in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia, 
approximately 240 nautical miles Southeast of Eyl, Somalia. On April 8, 2009, the crew 
under the master of the ship, Captain Richard Phillips, identified a blip on the radar and 
later identified it as an inbound pirate’s boat heading towards the ship. The crew fought 
to hinder the pirates from boarding the vessel. However, the pirates were able to board 
the ship. Following the prescribed anti-piracy drill, the crew disabled the ships control 
mechanism denying the pirate’s control. In the ensuing fight against the pirates, Captain 
Phillips and some of the crew were taken hostage. Meanwhile, the Alabama’s remaining 
crew under Chief Engineer, Mike Perry, managed to capture the ringleader of the pirates, 
Abduwali Muse, after a struggle in the darkened engine room. Subsequently, the crew 
attempted to exchange the captured pirate for Captain Phillips. Unfortunately, the 
exchange did not go as planned. The pirates regained control of the situation and fled the 
ship using a lifeboat of the Maersk Alabama taking Captain Phillips as a hostage.47 
b. Phase I - Planning 
The response to the hijacking involved the U.S. Navy ships, the United States 
Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge (DDG-96), the guided-missile frigate 
USS Halyburton (FFG-40), and the amphibious assault ship the USS Boxer (LHD-4). 
The standoff began on April 9, 2009, one day after the ship was attacked. However, the 
containment of the locus on the lifeboat had minimized the area of operation. Yet, it also 
                                                 
47Edmund Sanders and Julian E. Barnes, “Somalia Pirates Hold U.S. Captain,” New York Times, April 
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presented another level of difficulty: the life of the hostage was always under threat due 
to the close proximity with the pirates. 
The effort concentrated on rescuing Captain Phillips from the pirates who 
remained in the lifeboat. The pirates’ strategy was to take Captain Phillips to Somalia 
where any rescue attempt would be made more difficult. In the meantime, the pirates 
attempted to join their fellow pirates holding other vessels in captivity, so as to reinforce 
themselves while using their hostage as a human shield.  
c. Phase II – Approach & Assault  
After four days of standoff, Commander Frank Castellano the CO of the USS 
Bainbridge, with prior authorization from higher authority, deemed that Captain Phillips’ 
life was in imminent danger and ordered snipers from SEAL Team Six to take their shots. 
The SEAL team managed to kill three of the pirates with headshots, while the fourth 
pirate, Abduwali Muse, was onboard the USS Bainbridge, having arrived with the initial 
intention of talking to elders from his village and negotiating the terms of Captain 
Phillips’ release.  
d. Phase III – Post Assault 
Abduwali Muse was then captured and sent to America for trial where he was 
sentenced to 33 years in an American penitentiary. Captain Phillips was rescued without 
any injury.                     
2. Examined Special Operation aspects 
In the subsequent paragraph, we will analyze the above operation in light of the 
eight principles noted earlier. We also discuss that how adherence and/or violation of 





The collection of intelligence data was made possible with the use of a UAV 
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), ScanEagle.48  The use of the UAV was critical to providing 
pictorial information on the whole operation and the developing situation of the hostage 
rescue operation. 
b. Simplicity 
On the matter of simplicity, the effort took three Navy warship assets to ensure 
that the operation went well, although, some consider the deployment of three Navy ships 
an overwhelming response, one that made the effort less simple than it needed to be. 
Nevertheless, it was worth the effort. Moreover, the operation was a success due to the 
uniformity of the personnel involved, all of who shared similarities in tactics and 
operational doctrine. The deployment of a single branch in a rescue effort simplifies the 
chain of command and related structures during a mission.  
c. Purpose  
This operation to rescue Captain Phillips and his vessel, the MV Maersk 
Alabama, reflects the ideal goals mentioned by Gazit.49 The hostages could be rescued; 
no collateral damage occurred and the only casualties were the pirates; no political or 
military ramifications resulted due to the nature of the pirates and the failing state of 
Somalia. Both are incapable of responding to any security breach on their ground, 
including the rising number of pirate acts within Somali’s territorial waters. 
d. Repetition 
The rescue operation tested the expertise and skills of the personnel involved. The 
end result of the operation is proof of the skills of those individuals. Meanwhile, 
considering the scale of the rescue operation while the vessel had been secured and 
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guarded to the port of destination in Mombasa, vis-à-vis the pressure and rapid action 
needed to rescue the hostage in the lifeboat, carrying out of rehearsals was not a priority. 
However, this simplicity of plan and uniformity of rescue team compensated for this 
shortfall. 
e. Security 
The security of the operation was not crucial beyond standard measures (SOPs). 
Other than killing the hostages, which would have resulted in their own deaths, the 
adversary did not have any capability to use easily use information against the incoming 
rescue team. The pirates lacked any real capacity to use any information gained on the 
rescue operation to their benefit. 
f. Surprise 
The early arrival of the rescue force surprised the pirates and they were unable to 
move the hostage deep inside. The time gained here put the pirates into a force 
disadvantage. If surprise had been lost, the pirates might have called in for 
reinforcements or killed the hostage. For them, the initiative was lost.  
g. Speed 
The response was given promptly after a distress signal was transmitted by assets 
in the area. Planning and preparation was done without waste of any time and rescue 
team was deployed quickly. Therefore, rapid action and speed of response are more 
fundamental for the rescue operation. One lesson learned from this case is that both the 
speed of the operation and the rapid response of the rescue task force are essential to 
halting the further deteriorating situation of a hostage operation. One can only imagine 
how the situation might have worsened if the hostage had been taken inland deeper into 
the pirate’s nest. The operators’ skills, on the other hand, reflected the highest capability 
performance for any time-pressure occasion. Furthermore, because of the in time 
deployment of rescue team, a good and balance field assessment of the situation on the 
ground enabled the commander of the field to make the decision for prompt action when 
a life was at stake.  
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h. Deception 
Regarding the principle of deception, the rescue operators used deception against 
the pirates by assuring them that the village elders were willing to talk to them through a 
phone onboard the USS Bainbridge. This strategy calmed the pirates down stopped them 
from acting aggressively toward the hostage. This too blunted their initiative. 
During Phase I, the planning process of the operation, the principles of simplicity, 
security, and purpose are evident while the other principles do not appear to apply. In 
Phase II, the approach and assault, the principles of surprise, speed, operator’s skills, and 
deception are present. In phase III, the post-assault, the extraction plan does not require 
any specific principles since the hostage is already saved and in a safe haven aboard the 
navy ship.  
B. THE SY QUEST YACHT HIJACKING  
1. Chronology of the Story  
a. Background: 
The SY Quest hijacking took place off the coast of Oman on February 18th, 
2011.50 Nineteen pirates on a mother ship boarded the yacht with four American citizens 
onboard. The Americans were on an around-the-world trip using an American-flagged 
yacht and the attack was the first piracy act against an American-flagged ship since the 
attack on the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009. Much of the following analysis is based on 
logic and interpretation of known facts and results of the mission. Note: most of the true 
data by U.S. forces remains unavailable to non-Americans.  
b. Phase I – Planning 
Time is crucial in any rescue operation; therefore, lacking sufficient unclassified 
data, we must assume planning was conducted while underway to the area of operation 
by the SOF forces on the U.S. Navy Ships. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and 
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the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for how to deal in a hostage rescue operation should 
already exist for the U.S. Navy ships and operators. Three U.S. Navy Ships the USS 
Enterprise, USS Leyte Gulf, USS Sterett, and USS Bulkeley were assigned the mission to 
free the hostages. 
c. Phase II – Approach and Assault 
American forces arrived on February 21, three days after the hijacking. On 
February 22, during the negotiation process between the pirates and U.S. Navy personnel 
regarding the release terms of the hostages, the pirates attempted to fire a rocket-
propelled grenade at the USS Sterett. This act was followed by gunfire aboard the yacht. 
A boarding party dispatched to the yacht became involved in a brief skirmish with the 
pirates. The skirmish resulted in two pirates killed by gunshots and knife wounds while 
thirteen others surrendered. Unfortunately, the gun battle also wounded the hostages 
severely, and attempts to provide medical treatment were unsuccessful.  
Apparently, the shooting of the rocket-propelled grenade at the USS Sterett was 
an indication of the rising tensions among the pirates, and such tensions might be 
triggered by internal or external causes. One possible set of internal causes may have 
been friction among the pirates and the efforts of the yacht’s owner to fight back. The 
fact that there were two dead pirates in addition to those that were killed by the boarding 
party might be evidence of the friction that took place among the pirates.51 The 
possibility that the yacht’s owner tried to fight back might be accountable, yet, 
considering the ratio of 4 hostages to 19 pirates, that possibility is suspect. One external 
cause might have been the U.S. task force that was shadowing the yacht. The close 
proximity of the ships may have caused a panic among pirates and further could have 
provoked them to act recklessly toward the task force. The close quarters of the yacht left 
insufficient space for the pirates and hostages to move freely and may have quickly 
become an internal cause beyond the control of the task force. This condition may have 
caused discomfort and anxiety among those pirates capable of initiating a hasty act. On 
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the other hand, the USS Sterett should have avoided the movement and closing distance 
that caused the pirates to feel nervous and threatened.   
d. Phase III – Post-assault 
At the end of the operation, the U.S. forces managed to capture three of the pirates 
and sent them to the U.S. to face trial. Although the boarding party suffered no casualties 
and all the hijackers were killed or captured, the fact remains that, with the deaths of the 
hostages, the operation failed. Moreover, there were possible ramifications from other 
pirates, who became determined to hijack other American ships to avenge the deaths of 
their colleagues.  
2. Examined Special Operation aspects 
In the following paragraph, we analyze the above operation in light of the eight 
principles previously articulated. We will discuss that how adherence and/or violation of 
these principles contributed to the success or failure of the operation.  
The relatively brief contact with the pirates, which ended in the deaths of the 
hostages, is difficult to analyze. In accordance with Gazit’s goals of a hostage 
operation,52 the rescue operation was unsuccessful in that it failed to save the lives of the 
hostages. Some information and details of the rescue operation remain unavailable to the 
public. Therefore, the operational analysis of this incident is based on assumptions made 
by the authors and backed up by the standardization of rescue operations based on the 
Joint Publication 3-68 on Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).53  
a. Intelligence 
In terms of operational intelligence, in conjunction with human assets American 
technical assets enhance the intelligence picture. In this case, the rescue force did not 
seem to have any problem gaining the advantage due to the fact that the U.S. forces 
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already new the location of the hijacked yacht and the number of pirates involved. 
Presumably they did so with the assistance of UAV and satellite imagery.  
b. Simplicity 
On the matter of simplicity, the complete rescue force comprised the personnel 
from the U.S. Navy. The deployment of a single branch in a rescue effort simplifies the 
chain of command and related elements during a mission. However, even though such a 
U.S. rescue force achieved the simplicity in terms of force structure, the mission still 
failed. This may have been due to the reality that the force which contact the pirates 
immediately became involved in both negotiations exchanging fire.   
c. Purpose 
The purpose of the mission seems clear to outside observers: to rescue the four 
American citizens held hostage by the pirates. However, because the mission failed 
during the rescue attempt we cannot say with certainty (lacking information from the 
actual actors) that all members of the rescue team were focused on this mission.  
d. Repetition 
The contact force was ordered to move quickly, thus no time was available to 
rescue team to conduct tactical rehearsals. As the account of the event reveals, mis-
coordination between various elements might have been the reason of confusion, which 
resulted in mission failure. This shows that the importance of conducting rehearsals and 
repetition is vital for conducting rescue operations; however a perceived lack of time may 
often prevent adequate practice.  
e. Security 
The pirates did not have to technology or human resources to get the information 
about the U.S. plan, or to detect the movement of the assault force; therefore, no unusual 
arrangements for security were considered necessary during planning phase or during 
approach. Because the team was already in negotiation with the pirates, further 
concealing of the force was not deemed necessary. However, no account is available 
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about the contingency plan by the rescue force in the case negotiation failed, and whether 
that information was secured not.  
f. Surprise 
Surprise is mostly linked with initiative. An opportune moment has to be seized 
by taking the initiative to gain surprise. In this case, the upper hand of initiative was held 
by the pirates, who acted upon it by opening up the gun battle, thus no real surprise could 
be achieved by the rescue force. However, the rescue force may have tried to achieve 
surprise by first killing two exposed pirates on the boat, but the overall effort remained 
unsuccessful and resulted into the death of the hostages, even though 13 pirates were 
captured. 
g. Speed 
It took approximately three days for the task force to reach the known position of 
the hijacked yacht. In comparison, the previous U.S. task force took only one day to 
reach the target position of the MV Maersk Alabama. Despite the different nature of the 
case, speed remains a fundamental determinant for a rescue operation’s success. 
McRaven mentions that speed itself could ensure the offensive force gains relative 
superiority. Any delay in getting to the “objective may expand the area of vulnerability 
and decrease the opportunity of achieving relative superiority.”54 However, because the 
pirates where probably aware of the Maersk outcome, no element of speed might have 
been fast enough.  
h. Deception 
With regard to deception, there is no available information that the task force 
developed a deception plan. However, from the account of the Maersk it can be assumed 
that there might have been some deception plan being considered as the result of an SOP. 
It is believed by the authors that the negotiations were themselves a deception designed to 
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buy time, keep the pirates busy, and divert their attention from any rescue effort. Clearly 
it failed. 
Based on the NEO field manual, all the structures and organizational 
arrangements in an evacuation operation most likely had been organized properly. 
However, given the unpredictable, dynamic changes in the field there is no assurance that 
a previously well-managed plan will proceed accordingly once the human element comes 
into play. One lesson learned from this particular case is that an NEO should always be 
ready to encounter the worst-case scenario on the ground. Sometimes, even the best-
prepared operations can go wrong simply because the nature of the operation itself is 
highly volatile.  
Based on the operation failure, the three phases, and the principles of special 
operations, from the planning through the post assault phase, do not seem to have been 
applied effectively to this hostage rescue. Again, the major weakness of this case was a 
lack of good data. The authors recognize much of the narrative and analysis above is 
based on logical conjecture.  
C. OPERATION RED AND WHITE 
1. Chronology of the Story  
a. Background 
Operation “Red and White” was initiated as the operational response of the 
Indonesian government to the act of piracy by Somali pirates toward an Indonesian 
flagged ship, the MV Sinar Kudus having sailed from Kolaka, Indonesia with the port of 
destination of Rotterdam, the ship carried ferronickel in her hull. It was hijacked by 
Somali Pirates in the Gulf of Aden, near the Horn of Africa on 16th March 2011. The 
hijacked vessel was taken to the coastline of Eyl, Somalia. The Indonesian government 
responded by sending two frigates, along with a joint operation task forces from three 
branches containing Indonesian Special Forces personnel from the army, navy, and air 
force. Fundamentally, civil authority called for the deployment, while recognizing that 
the operation affected agreements in international relations (politics) and called into 
question the government’s capacity to safeguard Indonesian citizens abroad. In addition, 
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the deployed force itself had to travel a long distance to an extra-territorial region outside 
of the Indonesian territory. This fact made the governmental decision more complex and 
risky. The military responded by preparing an option to free the ship along with its 
hostage crew. The plan was then reported to the president for his decision. Public 
pressure had driven the government to fulfill the demand of the people, especially the 
relatives of the hostages, for a rescue mission of the MV Sinar Kudus. Three alternatives 
were considered for conducting the operation. The first involved the deployment of the 
Special Forces to the nearest multi-national alliance base (in Djibouti or Oman) and then 
moving toward the target area with multi-national ships. The second involved deploying 
Indonesian warships that included Special Forces personnel in the deployment. The third 
involved conducting an infiltration to the target area with a rubber boat (the “rubber 
duck” operation) and then subsequently infiltrating the pirate’s territory to save the 
hostages and release the ship from captivity. The complication of using multi-national 
assets in the target area and the risk of direct infiltration without sufficient support during 
the withdrawal phase for the third option discounted both the first and third options. The 
second option emerged as the most viable one for conducting the rescue mission.55  
b. Phase I – Planning 
The task force began preparing for the mission by conducting the planning and 
rehearsal, while waiting for the execution order from the President. The planning process 
involved the commander in chief of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Chiefs of 
the Army, Navy and the Air Force, along with the strategic commanders within the armed 
forces. The Marine Corps commander was then designated as the commander of the task 
force. The planning process and the rehearsal took place on an operational base for 
approximately one week. The rescue mission was prepared relatively hastily, considering 
the differences among the personnel in term of working ethic and culture, organizational 
structure, tactical and technical specialties, and chain of command. The familiarization 
among involved units was conducted in very brief time period. However, the military 
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 33 
decision makers considered the time sufficient for the units to work together on a 
challenging mission to rescue hostages in foreign territory.56    
Eventually, after so many considerations, the operation Red and White, named 
after the national flag of the Republic of Indonesia, was executed, on the order of the 
president. The operation involved approximately 488 personnel from three branches. The 
military operation was complemented by diplomacy and negotiations between the owner 
of the ship and the pirates’ group in Somalia.57  
c. Phase II – Approach and Assault  
The rescue operation was coordinated on board the steaming ship moving toward 
the mission area. The final decision to deploy would rest with the President of Indonesia. 
However, the negotiation between the owner of the ship and the pirates also had a 
deteriorating curve, since a faction of the pirates did not agree with the ransom amount 
offered by the owner. Apparently, from the intelligence report over the multi-national 
asset on the ground in the vicinity of the coastline, there were many ships in the same 
area in addition to the MV Sinar Kudus. There were several others ships of differing sizes 
and types being held by the pirates waiting for ransoms. Pirates with weapons guarded 
each of these ships. With this intelligence, the task force decided to make its approach 
while considering several options for operational conduct.58   
d. Phase III – Post Assault  
The operation ended when the owner of the ship agreed to pay the ransom 
requested by the pirates. The negotiation went through a third party mediator between the 
owner and the pirates. Nevertheless, the operation then changed into a salvage operation 
when the task force was directed to secure the extraction of the MV Sinar Kudus and 
avoid the possibility that the ship was being targeted by another group of pirates. Yet, the 
extraction did not go as planned. Apparently, there were other pirate groups trying to take 
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over the ship once the ransom was paid. The commander of the task force then deployed 
a small group of Special Forces to protect and cover the ship from an attempt to retake it. 
Eventually, the ship was recovered, and the task force along with the ship returned to safe 
haven in Salalah, Oman for replenishment and preparation to return to Indonesia.59     
2. Examined Special Operation Aspects  
In the following paragraph, we analyze the above operation in light of the eight 
principles previously articulated. We will discuss that how adherence and/or violation of 
these principles contributed to the success or failure of the operation.  
There are aspects of this case that can be examined in accordance with the theory 
and principles of special operations discussed in the previous chapter. First of all, the 
purposes of a special operation are fulfilled, according to Gazit60 in that all the hostages 
were rescued; there were limited collateral damages and casualties; the casualties were 
inflicted solely upon the perpetrators or terrorists; and, there were no further 
ramifications in either the political or military arenas. However, from a tactical aspect, 
there are many things can be scrutinized in order to develop the guidance for a future 
rescue operation, given that there is high probability a similar situation could take place.   
a. Intelligence 
In terms of operational intelligence, certainly, intelligence comes from many 
sources who are not assets of a task force, yet it also comes from friendly assets who are 
operating in the target area. In this case, although the information was reliable, it would 
have been better to have had a friendly source from Indonesia’s own assets for more 
discreet operation security. Meanwhile, the operators’ skill can only be measured after 
the mission had been accomplished and the results came out. In this case, the result was 
rather inconclusive due to the negotiation, and paying the ransom took the place of the 
military operation  
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Security 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 112, doi: 10.2307/2538532. 
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b. Simplicity 
The simplicity of the mission itself cannot be underlined, since the simple goal of 
the mission to rescue the hostages had widened with the involvement of the three Special 
Forces branches, each with the differing characteristics, along with the use of warship 
assets in the operation. It is interesting to speculate what the result of the joint operation 
of the Special Forces three branches’ would have been. This complexity somewhat 
undermined the simplicity of the operation. The three Special Forces branches operating 
together would be hindered by the different operational and tactical cultures each 
possessed. Simplicity can be achieved through operators familiar with one doctrine or set 
of procedures for a tactical deployment. The preparation of the task force with the 
combined rehearsals and practices was deemed insufficient for a mutual understanding of 
the operation at the tactical level. However, the result of the rehearsals was not put to the 
real test, due to the anti-climactic resolution of the crisis.  
There were several incongruences in the Red and White operation, including the 
arrangement for the operation. Although it was intended to occur on the high seas and in 
the territory of another country, the logistical preparation was not well formulated, and 
this lack of preparation forced the task force to take a longer route, which consumed time 
that should be used to derive a relative superiority over the pirates. Additionally, the 
tasked forces were unprepared for the relatively new threat taking place outside the 
national territory. Moreover, the inclusion of a formal risk assessment and risk 
management protocol during the operation did not seem to be a focus during the task 
force deployment. There will always be a risk in a NEO operation. However, the risk 
assessment should be made properly to enable the force to accomplish the mission, yet at 
the same time, minimize the risk impacted to one’s own force or a friendly force. A 
proper risk assessment involves identifying possible hazards, assessing possible hazards, 
developing the control ability, implementing the control and plausible action to act on it, 
and supervising the assessment and evaluating it once the mission is finished.61 
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c. Purpose 
In addition, from the beginning there was confusion over the purpose of the whole 
operation, including whether it would be a military rescue operation that would include 
diplomacy, or if it was primarily a diplomatic situation with the possibility of a military 
response. In any rescue operation it is essential that the executive stand on principle that 
the government will or will not negotiate with pirates. The confusion of the purpose 
might compromise the planned rescue mission assigned to a military task force. In this 
case, there were significant risks in deploying a military rescue operation in the effort to 
rescue both the hostages and MV Sinar Kudus.    
d. Repetition 
The rehearsal preparation that took place a week prior to the departure and the 
additional rehearsals onboard the warship were relatively insufficient to prepare the task 
force. The complexity of the operation with the aspects mentioned earlier demanded that 
the task force be highly dependent on each member of the team. However, the task force 
itself never entered the phase of field test on the results of their rehearsal. Therefore, the 
repetition and pattern of the task force members was not fulfilled satisfactorily. 
e. Security 
Regarding the special operations principle of security, there were no significant 
aspects of operation information that could have been compromised and provided an 
advantage to an adversary, in this case the pirates. The pirates lacked the technology to 
gather intelligence information from their own forces on the rescue operation. This lack 
of awareness should have been an advantage for the rescue operation and could have 
been used to further the element of surprise since the adversary would not know when 
and from which direction the rescue task force would come. Moreover, the tactical 
advantage was overwhelmingly on the task force’s side considering that trained personnel 
with tactical equipment prepared for critical situations such as this. 
 37 
f. Surprise 
As mentioned above, the task force possessed the element of surprise, yet this 
aspect was never used. The decision to move forward with the insertion was dependent 
upon the negotiation between the shipping company and the pirates through a third party. 
The time frame was reduced very quickly while the force waited for the negotiation to be 
settled, thus reducing the element of surprise. In McRaven’s words, the opportunity to 
achieve relative superiority had decreased very quickly.  
g. Speed 
Initially in this operation, the progress of the operation was slow as the 
deployment waited for an executive decision. Both the extensive logistics involved in the 
decision to deploy a relatively large number of Special Forces and the prolonged 
planning process, consumed time, and reduced the speed of the deployment. Furthermore, 
despite the great distance to the target, the operation required a rapid deployment in order 
to retain both the element of surprise and a tactical advantage. However, the planning 
process apparently did not consider speed and time as important factors in a rescue 
operation. Yet, in many operations, speed is a decisive factor that determines the end 
result.  
h. Deception 
Furthermore, this operation did not have any deception plan in place to be used 
against the adversary. This might have happened due to the lack of intelligence on the 
pirates and their intended movements with the target asset of the MV Sinar Kudus. It is 
clear that within the planning process, the task force should have had a deception plan 
inserted for the initial approach. However, the deployment of this particular plan would 
be under the disposal of the commander of the task force. Yet, the task force did not plan 
any deception towards the adversary since confusion existed between the negotiation plan 
and military plan.  
During the planning phase, the special operations principles of simplicity, 
security, and repetition were expected. However, an analysis of the simplicity principle 
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does not seem to apply since the plan expanded multiple times with the inter-services join 
operation. Yet, the principles of security and repetition still appear applicable given the 
operational security protocol and also the tactical and assault rehearsals that were 
conducted pre-departure of the task force. In phase II, the approach and assault phase 
does not seems to reflect the elements of surprise and speed, let alone the element of 
deception. The approach plan took time, giving the advantage of relative superiority to 
the pirates who were able to drag the ship further into their territory. Furthermore, the 
paid ransom did not allow the task force to launch an assault. The operators’ skills were 
slightly used when the released ship was targeted by another group of pirates. The task 
force launched an attack on the inbound pirate’s ship in order to defend the ship. In phase 
III, no applicable principles can be found in the post-assault process.  
D. SUMMARY  
From these three cases, the eight principles of intelligence, simplicity, purpose, 
repetition, security, speed, surprise, and deception appear fundamental in gaining the 
optimum result of a rescue operation. The capability to fulfill these aspects might expand 
the possibility for a successful operation aimed at the achieving the goals prescribed by 
Gazit.62 Table 1 explains that during all the three cases studies, which principles were 
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Table 1.   Relation of the Principles in the Case Studies 
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Case Study I Case Study II Case Study III 
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Looking at the cases described above, among the eight principles of special 
operations, the aspects of simplicity and speed apparently contribute significantly to the 
successful of a rescue operation at sea. A simple speedy plan can cover up the weakness 
of a lack of repetition, as was the case in Red and White operation and MV Maersk 
Alabama. The same time can be utilized in rapid deployment of the force to achieve 
speed and surprise. Rescue operations are similar in nature to a special operation. 
Therefore, the speed of deployment and response is essential to gaining superiority over 
the enemy. Thus, speed should be the focus in developing any rescue operation. Any task 
force that is able to move in a timely manner in reaching its objectives should have the 
advantage, and it is clear that time is the decisive factor of most operations. During the 
planning phase, the presence of simplicity, security, repetition, and purpose are 
fundamental. On the approach phase, the elements of security, surprise, speed, operator’s 
skills, and deception are crucial role to the success of the mission. While during the post-
assault phase, many of the eight principles may not be applicable, with the exceptions of 




IV. THE CONCEPT FOR INDONESIAN NEO 
The distinct environment of a rescue operation incorporates the nature of special 
operations, in that a rescue operation requires a special employment, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures. Therefore, the Indonesian government through its security forces, in 
particular its special forces, needs to take special measures in order to cope with unique 
threats by handling them with special-prepared forces to meet the nature and challenges 
posed by such threats. In this thesis, the authors specifically discuss the piracy threats in 
overseas territory. This section elaborates the roles of each institution from the strategic 
level to the tactical level and explains the role of each team during the deployment of a 
hostage rescue operation.  
At the strategic level, the government, in this case the department of defense 
(Kementerian Pertahanan), which supervised the Indonesian Armed Forces, should be in 
close coordination with the department of foreign affairs (Kementerian Luar Negeri) in 
order to assess the situation in the area of the mission involving the host nation, since that 
nation’s sovereignty will be compromised with the deployment of the mission. Whether 
the mission will penetrate deep into the host nation’s inland territory, or operate in the 
host nation’s water territory, the coordination between the department of foreign affairs 
and the host nation, through the diplomatic envoy of the designated ambassador in the 
respective nation, should be established as soon as possible, as time is critical to gain the 
relative superiority over the perpetrators of the existing crisis. In such critical cases 
involving the US, the U.S. government will establish a Washington Liaison Group 
(WLG) “that is responsible for coordination and implementation at the national level of 
all emergency and evacuation operations plans by DOS and DOD and by other USG 
agencies as appropriate.”63 In the WLG “the Secretary of Defense shall advise and assist 
the Secretary of State and the heads of other federal departments and agencies, as 
appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of U.S. citizens in 
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overseas areas.”64 As for the implementation in Indonesia, the ministry of defense shall 
act as the leading institution for all preparation encompassing the required institutions for 
the rescue operation. The Foreign Affairs Ministry shall consult with the host nation on 
diplomatic issues regarding the crisis within their territory involving Indonesian citizens. 
The government will form a temporary (ad-hoc) agency to accommodate the coordination 
and communication needed to prepare the operation deployment similar to the WLG. 
This ad-hoc agency shall be responsible for these issues:  
1. Offer recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in establishing a 
group that would liaise the interest of the Indonesian government to the 
respective nations that may be involved during the deployment of the 
rescue operation. These nations may be involved in providing logistic or 
political support.  
2. Provide advice to the liaison agency, the diplomatic and consular posts, 
and military commands involved in the rescue operation.   
3. Monitor all activities from all institution within the operation frame.  
4. Coordinate every step of the operation preparation with the ministry of 
defense and foreign affairs in relation to the rapidly changing 
environment.  
This ad-hoc agency shall consist of the representative of all respective ministries 
and institutions, including military personnel, so that as the field operator updates any 
incoming new information, that information is broadcast to all elements of the operation.   
Within the Defense Ministry, the minister is the designated official to report to the 
president. Moreover, the minister shall be coordinate all subordinates in the scope of the 
ministry from the Commander in chief of the Indonesian national armed forces, and the 
chief of staff of each service, to the combatant commander in the field. The minister shall 
supervise the preparation of the lower unit in order to align the preparation with the 
policy of the government, especially during rapid changes in the strategic environment.  
Coordination shall also be established with representatives of the host nation 
through diplomacy conducted by the ministry of foreign affairs. The accordance of the 
host nation is critical, since a mission within the area of operation may be considered a 
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violation of sovereignty if conducted without proper permission of the host nation. 
Moreover, the involvement of a non-governmental organization (NGO) in the operation 
may be necessary, particularly if the NGO provides humanitarian assistance in the case of 
an evacuation of large number of individuals.  
In the case of a U.S. operation, the ambassador of the respective region holds the 
highest coordination responsibility on the ground. However, in the case of Indonesia, the 
possibility of an ambassador holding the responsibility of a military operation is still 
highly unlikely. Therefore, the combatant commander would be the one responsible for 
overall implementation of an operational deployment. Looking at the case of the Red and 
White operation, the combatant commander onboard the deployed ship was the 
commander of the task force. In terms of organizational structure, the combatant 
commander, under the supervision of the minister of defense reports directly to the 
president, who holds the highest authority in making the operational decision while 
considering the changing situation in the strategic and tactical environment. The 
organization would form an advance headquarters, main body, and the evacuation force. 
The HQ would consist of the combatant commander and the diplomatic official 
designated to the mission. Together they would provide updated information on the 
mission and also the current condition of the overall environment. The main body would 
consist of the principal offensive force inserting into the target area and conducting the 
rescue. An evacuation force would be necessary if the evacuees are required to be picked 
up by other means of transportation than those employed by the insertion team. The 
necessity to establish a NEO coordination center depends upon the magnitude and the 
duration of the operation. The purpose of the center is to provide a central information 
exchange between institutions and, perhaps, other nations involved within the mission. 
The execution of an NEO may be conducted in three phases65:   
1. Planning phase. The activities like collecting of information about target 
and enemy, and conducting of rehearsal as per plan are carried out more so 
logistical aspects are also look into to support the mission.   
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2. Approach and assault. This phase involves move to the target area and 
execution of the mission. After the hostages are rescued, provision of 
necessary life saving medical first aid treatment. 
3. Post assault. The purpose of the whole NEO mission is to evacuate safely 
all of the evacuees to a prior-designated safe haven and withdraw all 
forces safely.  
It is important to remember that there may be many activities overlapping during 
various phases of the operation. That determination lies within the authority of the head 
of the mission, or the commander of the task force, or whomever may apply to the 
situation.  
Regarding logistic support, Indonesia rarely has an infrastructure in foreign 
countries that could support the entire operation. Therefore, the task force should be able 
to provide a short-notice logistic system that would guarantee sustainable support for the 
operation. If sufficient time exists, a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
can be arranged with the host nation. However, in a case where time is pressing, the task 
force could initiate an in-country resources arrangement through a private contractor to 
provide the support.  
The goal of the rescue operation should be measured according to Gazit’s66 
purposes that comprise of: 
1. The hostages can be rescued alive and well. 
2. The end result of the operation is conducted with no, or minimum, 
collateral damages or casualties. 
3. If there should be casualties, they should be limited to the perpetrators or 
terrorists. 
4. There are no further political or military manner ramifications that could 
affect wider aspects than the hostage rescue operation. 
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In addition to these goals, the rescue operation should fulfill the special operation 
principles67 that consist of:  
1. Intelligence. It involves use of all intelligence collecting sources to collect 
information about the target area, enemy, conditions and roots, and each 
collation and interpretation to assist and familiarization of some plan. The 
intelligence sources should also keep the commander and the forces on 
ground updated about any changes occurring all the above aspects.  
2. Simplicity. An operation plan should be made as simple as possible to 
assure full comprehension of the plan.   
3. Security. The security of the operation should be foremost, in order to 
retain the element of surprise and guarantee the secrecy of the mission. 
4. Repetition. The conducting of rehearsals and training is one factor in 
assuring the operation proceeds in accordance to the initial plan. In order 
to accomplish the purpose of a mission, the operators need to be skillful 
and able to conduct the mission. The capability of the force is fundamental 
to successfully completing the mission.  
5. Surprise. This critical factor contributes to the success of the mission and 
facilitates relative superiority over the adversary.  
6. Speed. This factor is the essential in order to gain relative superiority over 
the adversary. Therefore, a rapid deployment is required. However, a rapid 
deployment is only possible when all hardware and software are in place 
and ready to run. 
7. Purpose. The factor ultimately underscores the reason for the overall 
operation.  
8. Deception. The necessity to use deception is authorized by the task force 
commander. Nevertheless, deception is required to assure the element of 
surprise, the biggest advantage for the mission.  
These purposes and principles should be heavily considered by the mission 
planner and the decision maker on the field in order to gain relative superiority over the 
adversary. Furthermore, it is quite apparent that speed and rapid deployment are essential 
to achieving relative superiority during the mission. In order to have a rapid deployment, 
the government should have a systematic deployment that ensures all protocols and 
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procedures can be fulfilled accordingly. That system should include the existence of 
doctrine, guidelines, and a manual of operational conduct.  
All of the above aspects should be included in the development of an Indonesian 
evacuation and rescue operation, especially for those at sea. With a clear guidelines and a 
manual to follow, the deployment of a rescue operation is simpler for each institution 
participating in the mission with a corresponding greater chance of mission success.    
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V. IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis is intended to serve as a guide in the development of new doctrines 
and guidance for the Indonesian government, especially for the Indonesian task forces 
assigned overseas missions to rescue hostages. Based on the experience in deploying the 
Red and White operation off the Somalian coastlines, there are many aspects of the 
operation that require improvement and amelioration of conduct, especially in the 
coordination between the government and its international partners in assuring the flow 
of information and sustainable logistic support. Internally, the inter-services coordination 
among the Special Forces is essential for better joint operations in the future. Despite the 
type of the operation, inter-service Special Forces cooperation should be on the priority 
list of the Indonesian armed forces in order to improve its joint special operation 
deployment capability.      
With clear guidelines and a manual, the Indonesian government can define a 
purpose for the force to follow that would align with the foreign policy of the 
government. Moreover, a manual can provide steps and phases to be followed by the 
operator in coordination with the line of bureaucracy. Additionally, a set of well-
developed guidelines and a manual provide a mission framework, from the initial phase 
of operation planning, to the approach and assault, to the end phase of post assault. 
For that reason, the government, in this case the armed forces, should focus on 
improving the NEOs conducted by the Indonesian Special Forces. For example, the 
operation may be conducted by a single service in spite of a joint operation. The decision 
would depend on the magnitude of the operation and the capability needed to accomplish 
the mission. In viewing the conduct of a rescue operation among other operations, the 
government should divide it into two types of policy considerations.     
A. INTERNAL POLICY 
Respective authorities have to decide the best option to minimize the expenses 
and post effect risks. See the conceptual framework in Figure 1. 
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The figure above uses the case of MV Sinar Kudus as an example to describe the 
internal policy the government might develop in making the call for similar operations in 
the future. It is essential to give the highest assurance to the people that the government 
will do anything in its power to protect Indonesian citizens from any threat overseas, in 
particular the risk of piracy along the maritime trade routes. It is highly related to the 
national interest since the government is developing a maritime concept that will rely on 
the maritime economy to boost the national economy. This assurance can contribute to 
the positive build-up of an Indonesian maritime economy. Moreover, the Indonesian 
government should be able to act upon it with the ability to respond appropriately to an 
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emerging threat. It is important to create a deterrent effect to the possibility of future 
threats. The ability to conduct such operations may increase the government’s credibility 
throughout the country. The Indonesian government should establish a national 
mechanism to detect, access, analyse and decide the proper measures to cope and to 
counter the emerging threats. This mechanism, which would be identified in a formal 
guidance or manual, must involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process in the 
context of contingency action. There should be standard procedures. It is important, 
through the government’s legitimate security forces, the Indonesian National Armed 
Forces (TNI), build relevant plans, especially in force structure development, to 
anticipate any possible threat scenario to Indonesia citizen anywhere in the world. This 
process should include a command and control system that could accommodate an inter-
services joint operation in addition to a single service deployment. The comprehension of 
the mission should be recognized at a multi-national level so that similar ROEs may ease 
the understanding among the services or forces involved. For this reason, the making of 
common guidelines and manual is prerequisite for a mutual joint operation.  
The Indonesian National Armed Forces’ (TNI) capabilities depend highly on the 
provided resources, national economic strength, intelligent resources, personnel skill, and 
geographical, and tactical environments in order to overcome future threats despite the 
location. In line with those matters, the Indonesian government must have strategic 
guidance. This guidance should seriously consider the limited resources available for the 
mission. In the long run, the presence of such guidance and a manual would be an 
investment by the government in economically using its resources effectively and 
efficiently.   
B. EXTERNAL POLICY 
The Indonesian government, in accordance with international law, has to 
diplomatically coordinate with the host nation, the United Nation, maritime communities, 
and the international naval forces conducting law enforcement in the region of an act of 
piracy involving Indonesian citizens. The importance of this coordination is to assure the 
effort of the mission can be maintained with the support of the host nation and also allies. 
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The assurance of support is important in sustaining the mission and increasing the 
opportunity for a successful mission. In addition to the inter-governmental coordination, 
the cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is also crucial in 
increasing scale of the operation since the government may not be able to handle all 
humanitarian assistance required.      
The media also plays an important role in broadcasting the situation and 
conditions on the field. Therefore, a good publication should be one that focuses on other 
elements of the mission besides the technical aspect of the operation. A well-coordinated 
publication should be able to boost the morale of the forces and also the relatives of the 
hostages. Besides that, a deception plan and psy-ops may be launched through the media 
as a means of shaping perception through information directed towards the adversary.   
The government and the task force could cultivate a great advantage when they 
accumulate the benefits of an external policy that provides additional support and 
assistance to the success of the mission. Moreover, the ability to gather support is 
evidence of national credibility in the eyes of other countries. The existence of a well-
planned operation that is derived from a perfect conceptual guidance and a manual would 
add value to the operation and boost national credibility, perhaps even to the point of 




A. RESCUE OPERATIONS  
The emergence of new seaborne threats in the maritime domain, such as piracy on 
the high seas, has posed new challenges for any government whose economy relies on 
maritime trade. These threats are disrupting the world economy, in particular those 
countries whose economies depend highly on the sea lanes of trades (SLOTs) as the 
primary veins to sustain their economy. It is highly logical to conclude that the increasing 
number of seaborne threats is due to the corresponding increase in the complexity of 
maritime economy. The rate of occurrence of these seaborne threats also increases the 
possibility of abductions or hijacking that could end in the demand of ransom. Somali 
pirates, in particular, pose threats for any maritime shipping that passes in the vicinity of 
Somalia’s water territory. This threat has exposed a new challenge to national nations, 
and it is necessary for every nation to be prepared with a scenario that involves its citizen 
in a plot of abduction or hijacking. The effort to release the hostages without further 
collateral damage is known as a military operation other than war (MOOTW). For some 
advanced countries, the development of this type of military operation has reached the 
point of sustainment of operation, since the fundamentals of the operation have been 
sufficiently established. For Indonesia the development is a work in progress.  
The discussion of the previous three cases of hijacking has provided tests of eight 
fundamental principles, derived from both McRaven, and Perez, that indicate a rescue 
operation is a sophisticated and complex mission that requires well-prepared planning, 
execution, and withdrawal phases. The complexity of the operation is even greater when 
the mission area is outside the sovereignty of one country and would involve either 
friendly forces or the support from other governments to assure the accomplishment of 
the operation. The analyses of these cases are fundamentally focused on the operational 
and tactical levels. However, the overall rescue operation involves all levels of 
administration and security forces in order to make sure the support for the operation can 
be covered in all aspects.   
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Most importantly, the concept of a complex rescue operation should be 
comprehended by all decision makers, planners, and field operators in order to enact a 
well-planned operation with a common understanding of unity in action and purpose. For 
this reason, the concept should be made as simple as possible, yet still allow ample space 
for improvisation and development in accordance with the field dynamic and tactical or 
environment changes.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to implement the proposed ideas in this thesis, there are several 
recommendations that could be forwarded to the respective officials related to the 
improvement of guidance and development of a manual for special evacuation 
operations.  
1. Create a specific set of guidelines and a manual in accordance with the 
requirements of the strategic environment, in particular for the NEO 
mission. 
2. Take the purposes and the principles of special operations into 
consideration in formulating the guidelines and manual for a special 
evacuation operation. 
3. Formulate internal and external policies that would support the 
deployment of an overseas NEO mission.  
4. Improve the capabilities of joint services special operations through the 
means of doctrine and capability amelioration that could accommodate 
different capabilities and specialties. 
The above recommendations will fulfil the preamble of the Indonesian 1945 
Constitution that contains the phrase: “protect all the people and the entire country of 
Indonesia, promote the general welfare, the intellectual life of the nation, and participate 
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